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Uncertainty Monitoring in Sprague-Dawley Rats (Rattus norvegicus). 
 
Chairperson:  Dr. Wendy Shields 
 
Comparative psychologists have explored the metacognitive capabilities of rhesus 
monkeys, a capuchin monkey, an orangutan, a dolphin, pigeons, and rats.  Previous 
research with rats has demonstrated inconsistent results (Foote & Crystal, 2007; Smith & 
Schull, 1989).  In the current study, two Sprague-Dawley rats were tested in a tone-length 
discrimination task in which they were prompted to press one of two levers indicating 
“short” or “long” depending on the duration of a tone.  They also had the option to opt 
out of some trials.  If the subjects knew when they did not know the answer to the task, 
they were expected to opt-out more frequently as the difficulty of the task increased.  
They were also expected to demonstrate differences in accuracy for trials during which 
they could opt-out and trials in which they could not opt-out.  Higher accuracies were 
expected on trials during which they could opt-out.  One subject did not select the opt-out 
option during testing.  The other subject did not use the opt-out option adaptively by 
opting out more as the difficulty of the stimulus discrimination increased.  However, 
when comparing trials in which the subjects could not opt-out and those in which the 
subjects could opt-out, this subject demonstrated higher accuracies on trials in which he 
could opt-out.  This provides some evidence that at least one rat knows when he does not 
know the answer to a duration-discrimination task.  This experiment imparts clarification 
to previous research and provides further evidence for uncertainty monitoring among rats, 
lending greater understanding to the evolutionary development of uncertainty monitoring. 
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Uncertainty Monitoring in Sprague-Dawley Rats (Rattus norvegicus) 
Comparative research in metacognition has provided compelling insights into the 
phylogeny of at least one aspect of metacognitive processing (see Smith, Shields, and 
Washburn, 2003).  Specifically, however, previous research with rats has revealed 
perplexing and contradictory results.  The aim of the current study is to provide 
clarification of these results and further insight into uncertainty monitoring among rats. 
What is Metacognition? 
J. H. Flavell first formally used the term metacognition in 1976 to refer to 
knowledge of one’s own cognitive processes.  Metacognition is casually referred to as 
cognition about cognition, or thinking about thinking, and can also be defined as 
knowledge and control of one’s own cognitive processing (Brown, 1987; Flavell, 1979; 
Nelson, Narens, & Dunlosky, 2004).  Flavell (1979) argues that there are two key aspects 
of metacognition: metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experience.  
Metacognitive knowledge involves one’s understanding of his or her overall knowledge 
of cognitive or psychological phenomena (Flavell, 1987).  An example of this is an adult 
who recognizes that a specific memory may be fallible because she recalls previous 
errors in her own memory.  Metacognitive experiences refer rather to current, conscious 
processing.  This processing could be cognitive or affective.  One example could be a 
student who recognizes that the content of the lecture she is listening to is becoming 
increasingly more difficult.  Flavell maintains that both metacognitive knowledge and 
experience are key to metacognition.     
Several important distinctions need to be made about metacognitive processes.  
First, metacognition refers specifically to knowledge and experience of one’s own 
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cognitive states rather than knowledge of others’ cognitive states.  The latter is typically 
referred to as “theory of mind” and is thought to involve distinct processing from 
metacognition (e.g., Carruthers, 2008; Flavell, 1976; Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  
Secondly, metacognitive processes are also distinct from cognitive processes, although 
overlap certainly occurs (Brown, 1987).  For example, metacognition is often described 
as involving processes such as attention, conflict resolution, error correction, inhibitory 
control, and emotional regulation, all processes that may also be involved in various 
cognitive processes (see Shimamura, 2000).  Metacognition is distinct in that it involves 
thought about one’s own thinking, or a self-reflective quality.  For example, a student 
thinking about last night’s biological psychology lecture demonstrates a cognitive 
process, but his awareness that he can’t recall the term “long-term potentiation” even 
though he remembers hearing the term in class and knows that he knows it, is a 
metacognitive judgment.  What is metacognitive is cognitive, but what is cognitive is not 
always metacognitive.   
Metacognition is often used to discuss awareness involved in knowing what one 
knows and knowing what one does not know (see Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 2003).  
Feeling of knowing (FOK) is characterized by feelings of certainty about information 
stored in memory, such as the name of an acquaintance, even as one is unable to recall 
the information (Hart, 1965; Koriat, 1993, 1994, 1995; Miner & Reder, 1994; Nelson & 
Narens, 1990; Reder, 1994).  During a FOK, the individual is unable to retrieve 
information, although a feeling that the information resides in memory and is only 
temporarily unattainable persists.  One may be able to recall specifics about the intended 
memory, such as a first letter of the sought after name or the context associated with the 
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name (see Hart, 1965).  Indeed, one specific aspect of FOK is the tip-of-the-tongue 
(TOT) phenomenon.  William James (1890) was one of the first to write about the 
familiar TOT experience in his text, The Principles of Psychology.   
Evolutionary Roots of Metacognition 
Metacognition has been used as a distinguishing factor between humans and 
nonhuman animals, similar to the classic examples of tool use and language and is often 
touted as one of the hallmarks and highest levels of human information processing (see 
Carruthers, 2008).  It is reasonable to theorize that metacognitive processes and 
mechanisms may have also evolved along a continuum, such that evidence for 
metacognitive capabilities may exist in other species.   Considerable effort has been made 
in recent years to find a neurological basis for metacognition (Chua, Schacter, & 
Sperling, 2009; Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000; Gallo, Kensinger & Schacter, 
2006; Janowsky, Shimamura, & Squire, 1989; Kepecs, Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 
2008; Shimamura, 2000).  Neurological evidence revealing similarities between humans 
and nonhumans has been discovered in areas associated with conscious processing, 
including the thalamic midline and intralaminar nuclei (Seth, Edelman, & Baars, 2004; 
Shimamura, 1994; Van der Werf et al., 2002).  Further discovery of similarities and 
differences involved in metacognitive processes in human and nonhuman animals would 
lend greater understanding to the evolutionary development of metacognition and could 
reveal compelling insights into the phylogeny of metacognitive processes. 
Metacognitive capabilities, such as suspending responses, requesting additional 
information, and indicating certainty or uncertainty appear to be adaptive functions for 
human adults and older children (e.g., McGuinness, 2005; Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 
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2003).  Because metacognition was traditionally categorized as an exclusively human 
capability, indicative of higher-level thinking, an important next step in this line of 
research was to determine whether other species would display metacognitive processing 
capabilities.   
Comparative Research in Uncertainty Monitoring 
Much of the history of metacognitive research in humans has measured 
metacognition through procedures that require language, such as self-assessment 
questionnaires, pre- or post-experimental questions, and thinking-aloud measurements 
(e.g., Kreutzer, Leonard, & Flavell, 1977; Markman, 1979; McGuinness, 1990; Nelson & 
Narens, 1990; Wellman, 1977).  Humans are unique in their ability to report when they 
know something, as well as to report when they do not know (see Smith, Shields, & 
Washburn, 2003).  A verbal description of not knowing is often considered to be 
evidence of subjective uncertainty.  For example, when faced with a challenging trivia 
question, such as “Which element from the periodic table makes up diamonds?” if one is 
unsure of the answer, then one is typically well aware of his or her subjective uncertainty.  
This experience often is accompanied by affective consequences, such as frustration.  
Reporting both the cognitive (e.g., inability to access stored information) and affective 
(e.g., frustration) aspects of subjective uncertainty is often provided as evidence of 
metacognitive processes in humans.   
However, because language can be misinterpreted, misrepresented, biased, and 
even reproduced in non-living systems such as computers, further evidence of 
metacognition should be considered.  Even though language has been used as a 
measurement of metacognition in humans, lacking language skills does not necessarily 
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mean that an organism lacks metacognition or at least some aspects of metacognitive 
processing (see Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 2003).  Therefore, there was a need to 
develop tasks capable of measuring metacognition among nonverbal species.    
Comparative research in metacognitive judgments has revealed considerable 
evidence for at least some aspects of metacognitive processing in nonhuman animals (see 
Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 2003, but see also Carruthers, 2008).  For example, 
metacognitive research employing perceptual, problem solving tasks have revealed 
similar patterns of responding in rhesus monkeys, a capuchin, an orangutan, a dolphin, 
and humans (e.g., Beran, Smith, Coutinho, Couchman, & Boomer, 2009; Smith, 2009; 
Smith, Schull, Strote, McGee, Egnor, & Erb, 1995; Smith, Shields, Schull, & Washburn, 
1997; Suda-King, 2008; Washburn et al., 2006).  The literature also extends to other 
mammalian and non-mammalian species in search of evolutionary roots for 
metacognitive ability.  These studies broaden metacognitive research to pigeons and rats 
(e.g., Inman & Shettleworth, 1999; Sole, Shettleworth, & Bennett, 2003; Smith & Schull, 
1989; Foote & Crystal, 2007).  As will be discussed in more detail, the limited research 
involving metacognitive processing in rats is fraught with inconsistencies.   
Nonverbal tasks have been used to test metacognitive processing in both humans 
and nonhumans (e.g., Hampton, 2001; Shields, 1999; Shields, Smith, & Washburn, 1997; 
Smith & Schull, 1989; Smith, Shields, Allendoerfer, & Washburn, 1998; Smith et al., 
1995; Sole, Shettleworth, & Bennett, 2003; Washburn et al., 2006).  Nonverbal tasks 
used to test for metacognition involve two important steps, the presentation of a problem 
solving task that creates ambiguity and the option to decline (hereafter, opt out) or take a 
test (hereafter, opt in; Shields, Smith, & Washburn, 1997; Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 
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2003).  The problem solving task must include different levels of difficulty.  Variation in 
difficulty is necessary to measure distinctions in performance between opt-in and opt-out 
trials.  If the participants know that they know the answer, they should opt in, whereas, if 
they know that they do not know the answer, they should opt out.  In these experiments, 
performance was expected to decline for more difficult trials and opting out was expected 
to increase as difficulty of trials increases.   
Nonverbal metacognition experiments can vary in a number of ways, such as the 
type of task employed (memory-based or perceptual) and the timing of the prompt for an 
answer or opt-out option relative to the question (see Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 2003).  
It is the timing of the prompt for an answer that is most relevant to the following line of 
research.  One approach is to provide subjects the opportunity to opt in or opt out at the 
same time the answers are available.  Smith, Shields, Allendoerfer, and Washburn (1998) 
employed this task-type to test uncertainty monitoring among rhesus monkeys. This 
experiment tested two rhesus monkeys in a memory-based, serial probe recognition 
(SPR) task in which the prompt for an answer and the opt-out response were posed 
simultaneously.  In an SPR task, a series of items to be remembered is presented.  Then, a 
probe item is displayed and subjects are prompted to indicate whether the probe was 
included in the last set or not.  In this case, pictures of polygons were first presented.  
Then, a probe, a polygon that had either been presented in the last set or not was 
displayed.  Monkeys (as well as humans) often reveal a pronounced primacy and recency 
effect in SPR tasks.  When graphed, this creates a characteristic “U-shaped” curve in 
which the middle items in a list are recalled less frequently than the first and last items of 
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the list.  In this experiment, an opt-out option allowed the monkeys to “escape” into a 
guaranteed win trial.   
Results revealed a U-shaped serial position curve and an opt-out curve that 
mirrored it.  As accuracy in memory declined for the middle items in the list, the opt-out 
rate increased.  Opting out occurred less frequently for the most recalled items of the list 
(i.e., the earliest and most recent items).  The monkeys used the opt-out option in an 
adaptive way, to avoid trials in which difficult serial positions were probed and during 
which memory was relatively poor.  These results were compared to human performance.  
Human performance was similar to that of the rhesus monkeys in uncertainty monitoring 
when employing a serial probe recognition.      
In another simultaneous judgment-and-test design, Smith, Shields, Schull, and 
Washburn (1997) employed a psychophysical task to test uncertainty monitoring in 
rhesus monkeys.  In this study, two rhesus monkeys were tested in a psychophysical 
density-discrimination task.  They chose one response option if exactly 2,950 pixels were 
illuminated in a box on a screen or another option if fewer than 2,950 pixels were 
illuminated.  Difficulty of the task was based on titration of pixels, such that 2,000 pixels 
(further from threshold) would be easier to identify than 2,500 pixels (closer to 
threshold).  Thus, the range of stimuli prone to error could be empirically determined.  A 
third, opt-out option led to an easy, guaranteed win trial.  The monkeys declined trials 
most frequently at the perceptual threshold.  Thus, they used the opt-out response 
adaptively on these difficult trials.  Results were compared to human performance in a 
similar task.  Both monkeys and humans were found to use the opt-out option for trials 
that fell in the uncertain range of stimuli.  
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Much of the research in metacognition among humans involves “prospective 
tasks” (see Nelson & Narens, 1990).  Prospective procedures involve asking subjects a 
general question first, then presenting subjects with an option to opt in or out, and finally 
cueing subjects for an answer (e.g., Hart, 1965; Nelson & Narens, 1990).  Hence, 
prospective tasks require subjects to make judgments about their knowledge before 
presenting them with answer alternatives.  In this way, prospective tasks are fairly 
complex because subjects must determine their level of confidence prior to the 
presentation of the potential answers.   
Several studies used a prospective task to test memory monitoring among rhesus 
monkeys (Hampton, 2001; Shields, 1999).  Using a paired-associate task with polygon 
shapes, Shields (1999) tested a monkey’s ability to link a sample polygon to a target.  The 
correct match to the target had to be learned as it was based on correct associations 
between the target and the sample on previous trials.  This task requires memory for 
previous matches.  Some associations were displayed less frequently than others, 
increasing their difficulty.  A sample polygon (opt in) and a star (opt out) were displayed 
on a screen (judgment phase).  Moving a cursor to the sample polygon indicated a 
judgment of knowing (opt in) and led to a second screen (the test phase) with the correct 
match to the sample (the target) and an incorrect foil.  Moving the cursor to the star 
during the judgment phase indicated a judgment of not knowing (opt out), and also led to 
the test phase.  Correct responses led to a food reward in both the opt-in trials and the 
opt-out trials.  Incorrect responses during the opt-in trials led to a long timeout whereas 
incorrect responses during opt-out trials led to a very brief timeout.   
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Results indicated that the monkey’s accuracy decreased on more difficult trials for 
both the opt-in and opt-out trials.  However, if the monkey was making decisions based 
on metacognition, one would expect to see more opt-outs during trials involving 
associations that were presented less frequently and were, therefore, more difficult.  Yet, 
the opt-out rate was not related to the trial difficulty.  The monkey was not declining 
more difficult trials and did not use the opt-out response as a judgment-of-not-knowing.  
Further, the monkey’s accuracy for trials taken and trials escaped were nearly identical.  
Accuracy comparisons between opt-in and opt-out trials are crucial in metacognition 
experiments.  These accuracy comparisons determine whether the opt-out option is being 
used adaptively because one would expect performance to be better for opt-in trials and 
worse for opt-out trials if participants know what they know and know what they do not 
know.  Humans tested in a similar task showed greater accuracy for opt-in trials than opt-
out trials, as would be expected if one were to use the opt-out response as a tool to deal 
with difficult, error-prone trials.  The monkey was not helping himself by opting out, but 
rather seemed to be using the opt-out response arbitrarily across trials.  The monkey was 
not using the opt-out response adaptively as do most humans in tasks involving 
prospective memory monitoring.   
Hampton (2001) conducted a similar study testing memory monitoring in two 
rhesus monkeys using a delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) task.  A sample was 
displayed on a screen during a study phase and was removed to create a forgetting 
interval.  The forgetting interval varied from 15 s to over 100 s.  After the forgetting 
interval, the monkeys were given a choice between taking (opting in) or declining (opting 
out of) the test in two-thirds of the trials (Choice trials).  Taking the test resulted in a 
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desired food reward for correct matches or a timeout for incorrect matches.  Declining the 
memory test resulted in a less desired food reward and no risk of a timeout.  In the other 
one-third of the trials, the monkeys had to take the test (Forced trials).   
The monkeys were expected to decline more difficult choice trials, or those trials 
in which there was a longer forgetting interval (Hampton, 2001).  Also, similar to the 
accuracy comparisons made between taken and declined trials in Shields’ (1999) study, 
Choice trials were predicted to produce better performance than Forced trials because 
monkeys could decline trials for which they did not know the correct match to the 
sample.  One monkey performed consistently with both the predictions based on 
metamemory.  He declined difficult trials more frequently, and his accuracy for trials in 
which he could not escape was lower than that of trials in which he could opt out.  The 
other monkey declined more difficult trials, but did not perform better on Choice trials 
compared to Forced trials.  
A third and final approach has been used to test uncertainty by changing the order 
in which answers and judgments are prompted following a question.  A retrospective task 
is one in which a primary discrimination response (e.g., categorizing stimuli as dense or 
sparse) is followed by a confidence rating (Shields, Smith, Guttmannova, and Washburn, 
2005).  Retrospective tasks require subjects to recall the initial problem (e.g., pixel 
density) and their solution (e.g., dense or sparse), and to rate their level of confidence for 
the answer they provided.  Subjects are required to use the confidence-rating scale to 
retrospectively assess their accuracy.  However, like prospective tasks, retrospective tasks 
introduce an additional layer of complexity in uncertainty monitoring procedures.   
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Smith and Schull (1989) extended comparative research in uncertainty monitoring 
tasks by using a psychophysical methodology to test rats in a simultaneous judgment-
and-test task.  Similar to the pitch discrimination used by Smith, Schull, Strote, McGee, 
Egnor, and Erb (1995), Smith and Schull used a pitch discrimination task in which rats 
learned to respond to similarities and differences in tone pairs by pressing levers.  Rats 
also had the option to select an opt-out response by pulling a chain.  Over the course of 
each experimental session, differences in tone pairs were reduced, causing distinctions 
between identical tone pairs and different tone pairs to be more difficult to determine.  As 
the tones in each pair become more objectively similar, subjects reach a point at which 
they are equally likely to press the lever associated with the “same” tones in a pair and 
the lever associated with “different” tones in a pair.  The task of categorizing the tones in 
each pair becomes so difficult that the subjects are reinforced at chance accuracy.  If rats’ 
behavior were consistent with that of humans and monkeys in uncertainty monitoring 
tasks, they would be expected to opt out more frequently on these trials in which they are 
objectively uncertain (responding at chance) and being reinforced only fifty percent of 
the time.  However, while the rats were able to learn the discrimination task, the results 
revealed that the rats did not opt out on a large proportion of these objectively uncertain 
trials.  The rats did not appear to use the opt-out response in an adaptive way as humans 
and monkeys do.   
Because these rats did not use the opt-out response often nor did they use it 
adaptively for objectively uncertain trials, Smith and Schull (1989) questioned whether 
there was something aversive about using the opt-out.  Perhaps the rats were sensitive to 
the uncertain trials but were simply not motivated to opt out.  Therefore, they introduced 
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a new trial which would, like the uncertain trials previously, result in a fifty percent 
reinforcement rate.  A high-pitched tone quickly repeating was the new trial type.  Unlike 
the tone pairs that were the same or different, there was no correct answer for the new 
trial type.  Regardless of the whether the rats chose “same” or “different”, they were 
reinforced fifty percent of the time.  The number of opt-out responses occurred three 
times as often during these chance performance trials that were signaled externally (by a 
different stimulus type) as during the uncertain trials.  This finding reveals that rats will 
use the opt-out option discriminately at a chance reinforcement rate if this rate is signaled 
externally. 
These experiments suggest that rats do not select opt-out responses in the same 
way that humans and rhesus monkeys select them (Smith et al., 1989).  Smith and Schull 
argue that rats may not experience an internal cue designating uncertainty as humans do 
and, thus, they do not use the opt-out response more frequently as the task grows 
increasingly difficult.  Interestingly, the rats do use the opt-out option for trial types in 
which they are reinforced fifty percent of the time and there is no correct answer, 
indicating that they are sensitive to chance reinforcement.  Specifically, it is the 
metacognitive component of the Smith and Schull task that the rats do not perform.  
However, Smith and Schull (1989) suggest that a different methodology could 
still indicate uncertainty monitoring.  Again, it is important to provide nonhuman animals 
every opportunity to display uncertainty monitoring in a domain that is most natural for 
the animal.  What best reveals uncertainty for human participants may not be the same for 
nonhuman subjects.  Just because rats are not monitoring uncertainty in a given task does 
not mean that they are incapable of doing so altogether.   
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In a more recent attempt at testing the metacognitive capabilities of rats, Foote 
and Crystal (2007) used an experimental design based on that of Hampton’s (2001) 
research with rhesus monkeys.  In this experiment, rats were tested in an auditory 
duration-discrimination task in which they were first exposed to white noise ranging in 
length from 2-8 s.  Noise durations were logarithmically scaled.  Short noises were 
defined as noises of 2.00, 2.44, 2.97, and 3.62 s in duration, whereas long noises were 
defined as those of 4.42, 5.38, 6.56, and 8.00 s in duration.  The durations closest to the 
category boundary (3.62 s and 4.42 s) were the most difficult to determine.  Initially, 
correctly categorizing each noise was dependent on trial-and-error learning.   
In two-thirds of the trials rats could take the test or opt out.  During these trials, 
left and right nose-poke apertures were illuminated following presentation of noise.  One 
of the nose-pokes was associated with taking the test and resulted in presentation of the 
retractable levers.  In this condition, rats were to then press either a left or right lever to 
indicate a short or long duration.  Correct responses resulted in a food reward of six 
pellets.  Incorrect responses resulted in no reward.  The other nose-poke was associated 
with declining to take the test and did not result in the presentation of levers.  Declined 
trials resulted in an automatic, smaller food reward of three pellets.     
In the other one-third of trials, rats were not given the option to opt out.  During 
these trials, only the nose-poke associated with taking the test was illuminated following 
the stimulus.  They were to press either a left or right lever to indicate a short or long 
duration.  Again, correct responses resulted in a food reward of six pellets.  Incorrect 
responses resulted in no reward.   
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Comparisons in accuracy were made between trials in which the rats had to select 
an answer (Forced trials) and trials in which the rats could opt out (Choice trials).  While 
only three of eight rats were included in Foote and Crystal’s (2007) results, these three 
declined most frequently on tests in which the discrimination between short and long 
tones was the most difficult.  Accuracy was worse for Forced trials.  Foote and Crystal 
argue that this is the first evidence that rats are capable of metacognition.  The rats 
declined most frequently during difficult trials and their accuracy was worse during 
Forced trials compared with Choice trials.  These results are similar to that of humans and 
monkeys engaged in uncertainty monitoring tasks.   
The outcomes of the two metacognitive studies with rats were significantly 
different.  Those obtained during the prospective task (in which the judgment phase 
preceded the test phase) used by Foote and Crystal (2007) revealed increased trial opt-
outs as difficulty increased and worse performance during Forced trials.  Smith and 
Schull (1989) used a design in which the judgment and test phases were simultaneous.  
There are important distinctions in the effort required by subjects in the simultaneous 
versus the prospective tasks.  The simultaneous task requires only one response from the 
subject compared to the prospective task which requires two responses, an indication to 
opt in or opt out and an answer to the question.  For these reasons, one might expect the 
simultaneous task to have been less taxing than the prospective task.  Yet, Smith and 
Schull’s rats did not use the opt-out response more frequently as the task grew 
increasingly difficult.  The unexpected nature and inconsistency in these two sets of 
results makes the state of metacognitive processes in rats difficult to interpret.          
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While Foote and Crystal (2007) should be commended for their pioneering work 
in the area of metacognitive research among rats, several major problems exist with the 
bold assertions drawn from their experiment.  First, the high number of dropouts is a 
major concern.  According to Foote and Crystal, five of the eight rats were unable to 
learn the contingency of the nose-poke apertures.  These five rats did not use the opt-out 
response adaptively to avoid difficult trials.  Therefore, the data for these rats was 
eliminated.  However, it is important to understand why these rats were not learning the 
contingency of the nose-poke apertures.   
Secondly, the procedure used by Foote and Crystal (2007) was a “prospective 
task” in which the rats were first given a question (a particular duration), then given the 
option to opt in or out, and finally asked to answer whether the duration was short or 
long.  A prospective task may have been an unnecessarily complicated procedure to use 
for a fundamental experiment in uncertainty monitoring among rats because it requires an 
assertion of certainty or uncertainty prior to providing the answer about the duration 
length.   
Another limitation of the Foote and Crystal (2007) experiment was that the lower 
accuracy for Forced trials compared to Choice trials was only observed during the most 
difficult trials.  Rather than finding a gradual separation in the proportion of correct 
answers between Choice and Forced trials as difficulty increases, a sharp contrast in the 
proportion of correct answers between Forced and Choice tests was only found on trials 
with the greatest stimulus difficulty, or those trials near the subjective middle of the short 
and long durations.  Part of the explanation for this finding is the ceiling effect.  The rats’ 
performance was at or near one hundred percent for the majority of the easier trials.  To 
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avoid limited data due to ceiling effects on easier trials, smaller intervals of stimulus 
difficulty should be used.  Further, rats opted out at fairly high rates during easier trials in 
which their accuracy was high.  Because of these inconsistencies, it would be both 
interesting and scientifically fruitful to investigate more trials at smaller incremental 
values during the difficult levels.  
Additionally, Forced trials went significantly below chance performance at the 
most difficult level for at least one and possibly two of the three rats included in Foote 
and Crystal’s (2007) results.  One would expect the worst performance to be fifty percent, 
an equal likelihood of choosing the correct or incorrect answer, during the most difficult 
trials.  Instead, one of the rats consistently selected the lever associated with the long tone 
duration when it was in fact the short tone duration and vice versa.  If the metacognitive 
task was initially learned and performance was reliable, performance should not drop 
below chance.  It is unclear what would cause such a performance pattern.  One should 
note that this behavior cannot be accounted for using a side bias explanation.  Bias for 
either the short or the long lever would result in consistently better performance for either 
the short or the long tone rather than decreased accuracy for both types of tones.  Given 
that performance was odd on these most difficult trials, one wonders what it means that 
this was the only trial type for which different accuracies were obtained for Choice versus 
Forced trials.  Clearly, this study has problems that interfere with the claim that this is the 
first evidence of metacognition in rats that was offered by the authors. 
In the current study, the aim was to further explore uncertainty responses in rats.  
A combination of the strengths between Smith and Schull’s (1989) experiment and Foote 
and Crystal’s (2007) experiment was used.  In the current study, a tone-length 
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discrimination task similar to that of Foote and Crystal (2007) was used to test 
uncertainty in Sprague-Dawley rats.  However, the current study did not use a 
prospective task in which the rats were required to make a judgment and then take the 
test.  Like the procedure used by Smith and Schull (1989), the current study prompted the 
rats to select an answer following the stimulus.  In this case, after rats were exposed to a 
stimulus, they were prompted to press one of two levers indicating “short” or “long” 
depending on the duration.  They also had the option to decline a trial by using a nose-
poke aperture on some trials.  The options to opt out of the trial (i.e., break the 
photobeam of light in the nose-poke aperture) or to proceed with the trial (i.e., press the 
right or left lever) were available simultaneously on these trials.  Further, smaller 
intervals of stimulus difficulty were presented to avoid limited data due to ceiling effects 
on easier trials.  In the current study, rats were expected to have the lowest accuracy on 
the most difficult test trials in which they could not “opt out.”  Further, it was expected 
that when given the option, rats would “opt out” most frequently on difficult test trials.   
This experiment espoused a straightforward design to allow an opportunity for the 
rats to display uncertainty monitoring without an intermediate judgment step before the 
test phase, which is required during a prospective task.  Further, smaller stimulus 
increments allowed for a broader variation in accuracy and aided in determining the 
causes for particular behavioral patterns.  Finally, comparisons in accuracy were also 
made for Forced compared to Choice trials.    
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Methods 
Subjects  
Two male Sprague-Dawley rats, R01 and R02, served as subjects.  Both subjects 
were approximately 90 days old at the beginning of the experiment and weighed 
approximately 478 grams.  The rats were maintained at 85% of their ad-libitum weights 
through supplementary post-session feeding.  Ad-libitum water was available in their 
home cage and testing chambers at all times.  The rats were housed together in a 
polycarbonate cage (480 mm x 270 mm x 220 mm).  All procedures were approved by 
the University of Montana’s institutional animal care and use committee (IACUC). 
Apparatus  
Two identical, sound-attenuated cabinets with a Standard Modular Test Chamber 
(Med Associates, Inc., ENV-008) were used.  Each chamber had two retractable lever 
presses (Lafayette retractable lever, model number ENV-112CM) positioned along the 
same plane on one wall.  A lever-press was recorded after a 3 mm depression of the lever 
with a force of 0.20 N.  A pellet dispenser was positioned outside the chamber (280 mm 
above the base) and attached to the food trough (20 mm above the chamber floor and 30 
mm from the center of the chamber).  Also, a nose-poke aperture was centered 80 mm 
above the chamber floor and extended 12 mm from the left and right center of the 
chamber. The nose-poke aperture contained a photobeam that had to be broken in order 
to detect the presence of the rat’s nose.  A discriminatory light (110 mcd, orange LED) 
was added inside the nose-poke to signal activation.  A speaker was attached to the test 
chambers on the wall opposing the lever presses, nose-poke aperture, and pellet 
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dispenser, and a computer delivered auditory stimuli. A computer also recorded lever-
press and nose-poke responses. 
Procedure 
Training procedures were similar to those used by Foote and Crystal (2007).  
Training and testing procedures were performed seven days a week during the current 
study.  In magazine training, subjects received a sucrose pellet (Dustless Precision 
pellets, 45 mg; Bio-Serv, Frenchtown, NJ) on a 30 s variable interval schedule for 30 
min.  Magazine training continued for five days.   
Next, lever press pretraining began during which two retractable levers were 
inserted.  The subjects were trained to lever press for 30 min per day.  A single sucrose 
pellet was delivered following orientation toward or movement toward either lever.  After 
five days lever pressing was a reliably established behavior in both subjects.  Single lever 
press training began during which one lever was inserted and a sucrose pellet was 
delivered based on a single lever press.  Then, the previous lever was retracted and either 
the same lever or the other lever was immediately extended.  Again, a single pellet was 
delivered based on a single lever press.  The levers were pseudo-randomly ordered such 
that no more than three of the same lever was extended in a row.  Single lever press 
training continued until 60 min passed.  After two days of single lever press training, the 
subjects were required to press either lever twice (ratio requirement of two) for the 
delivery of a sucrose pellet.  Single lever press pretraining at a ratio requirement of two 
continued for approximately three weeks.  Both subjects were lever pressing an average 
of 47 times each training session at the end of this training period. 
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Next, nose-poke pretraining began.  Subjects were trained to break a photobeam 
of light in a nose-poke aperture centered above the right and left lever presses.  Once 
nose-poking behavior was shaped, nose-poke training began during which subjects were 
required to break the photobeam to receive a sucrose pellet.  Once the photobeam was 
broken, one sucrose pellet was delivered.  This continued until 60 min passed.  Nose-
poke training continued for five days until the rats were reliably breaking the photobeam 
with more than seventy nose-pokes per training session.  
Duration-discrimination training then began. The subjects were trained to 
discriminate short and long tone durations.  Tones were used in the current experiment in 
place of white noise used by Foote and Crystal (2007) with the assumption that it might 
be a more salient stimulus.  First, an 1800 Hz pure tone at 70 dB of either 2.0 or 8.0 s was 
immediately presented. Then, both the right and left levers were inserted.  Left and right 
lever assignment was counterbalanced between subjects.  Either a left or right lever press 
(whichever was associated with the correct response for the short or long tone duration 
for that particular rat) resulted in a food reward (1 sucrose pellet).  Incorrect lever presses 
did not result in a reward or delay during training.  After either a correct or incorrect 
response, the levers were retracted and an intertrial interval (hereafter ITI) of 45 s 
occurred.  Next, another tone (either 2.0 s or 8.0 s) was presented and the rat was 
reinforced for pressing the correct lever.  Short (2.0 s) and long (8.0 s) tones were 
pseudo-randomly presented during the remainder of the trials, such that an equal number 
of both short and long tones were presented and no more than three short or long tones 
were presented in a row.  Duration-discrimination training continued for 60 min.  This 
training lasted for three weeks until the subjects were reliably identifying the durations as 
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short or long at approximately 80% accuracy.  This ended training and a pilot study 
began to determine the effectiveness of the training methods. 
Pilot Study 
During the testing phase of the pilot study, difficult trials were introduced. Trial 
difficulty was determined using a similar logarithmic scaling principle used by Church 
and Deluty (1977) and Foote and Crystal (2007).  However, the task was made more 
difficult than Foote and Crystal’s in an attempt to reduce or eliminate the ceiling effects 
that they found.  Eight levels of stimulus difficulty were used between 2.0-8.0 s.  Four of 
these were short durations and four of these were long durations.  The four levels for 
short stimuli were (2.00, 2.63, 3.17 and 3.82 s).  The four levels for long stimuli were 
(4.19, 5.04, 6.06, and 8.00 s).  Tone durations closest to the midpoint (i.e., 3.82 and 4.19 
s) were most difficult to discriminate (Church & Deluty, 1977; Stubbs, 1976).   
Consistent with Foote and Crystal (2007), two-thirds of the trials (16 trials) 
included the opt-out option.  At the beginning of these trials (Choice trials), an 1800 Hz 
pure tone at 70 dB was played.  The conclusion of each tone was immediately followed 
by the insertion of both right and left levers and the nose-poke aperture was 
simultaneously illuminated.  The tone duration was pseudo-randomly selected from the 
eight different 2.0-8.0 s durations previously described, such that an equal number of 
each duration was presented and no more than three short or long tones were presented in 
a row.  Subjects’ responses were measured, including presses on the right or left lever 
and photobeam breaks inside the nose-poke aperture. Presses of the “short” lever 
contingent with short tones (2.00-3.82 s) and of the “long” lever with long tones (4.19-
8.00 s) were considered correct responses and resulted in a food reward (3 sucrose 
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pellets).  Incorrect responses, lever presses that did not match the tone length, resulted in 
no reward and a delay (15 s).  A third “opt-out” option (the nose-poke) was available.  
Breaking the photobeam of light in the nose-poke aperture resulted in a lesser food 
reward (1 sucrose pellet).   
Subjects in the current study were rewarded for correct responses with fewer 
pellets than were the rats in Foote and Crystal (2007).  The amount of reinforcement in 
the current study (3 sucrose pellets for a correct response and 1 sucrose pellet for opting 
out) was selected due to a concern that the subjects might have opted out too much 
(Mazur, 1988).  One of the subjects in the Foote and Crystal study opted out on more 
than 40% of trials at the least difficult levels.  Such a result makes suspect the claim that 
this rat was opting out in response to perceived difficulty.  In the current task, risk-
aversion was indicated by use of the opt-out response (i.e., averting the risk of no reward 
and a penalty time-out due to an incorrect response).  However, an equal but contrasting 
concern was that the subjects might not have opted out enough for the data to be 
interpretable. As mentioned in the introduction, this is what happened in the Smith and 
Schull (1989) study.  The use of a nose-poke aperture as the opt-out response was meant 
to reduce the likelihood that the subjects would not use the opt-out response.  Set at an 
appropriate height, the nose-poke aperture mimicked a natural behavior of rats and was 
thought to be more likely to encourage responding than the pull chain used by Smith and 
Schull. 
The other one-third of the trials (8 trials) were Forced trials.  During the Forced 
trials the nose-poke aperture was not illuminated and did not function.  Subjects were 
required to select the right or left lever to indicate short or long tone lengths.  Sixteen 
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Choice trials and eight Forced trials were run two times each day for each subject such 
that forty-eight trials were run for each rat each day.  An ITI of 45 s immediately 
followed the response on each Choice and Forced trial.  Accuracy for long and short lever 
responses was measured for both the Choice and Forced trials.  Latency was measured 
from the onset of the tone until the lever or nose-poke response.  Each subject was to 
have participated in testing until at least 80% consistency in responding across trials was 
reached. 
After three days of testing and no opt-out responses, a nose-poke discrimination 
program was implemented in which the rats were required to break the photobeam of 
light inside the nose-poke.  The nose-poke was activated on a variable interval schedule 
of 30 s for twenty trials per day.   The nose-poke retraining program was run each day 
immediately preceding the full testing program.  This discrimination program was 
implemented in an effort to retrain the subjects in the use of the nose-poke following the 
initial exposure to the nose-poke during training several weeks earlier.    
Following two weeks of additional daily testing preceded by the nose-poke 
discrimination program, no opt-out responses were recorded by either subject.  Both rats 
also exhibited a response bias for the lever associated with the short tones during this 
two-week testing period.  R01 demonstrated 88.8% accuracy for short tones and 63.9% 
accuracy for long tones during Choice trials; he demonstrated 83% accuracy for short 
tones and 75% accuracy for long tones during Forced trials. R02 demonstrated 75.8% 
accuracy for short tones and 72.1% accuracy for long tones during Choice trials; he 
demonstrated 83.9% accuracy for short tones and 73.2% accuracy for long tones during 
Forced trials.  Several additional program changes were implemented to encourage use of 
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the nose-poke and to address the response bias.  First, one of the eight previously 
described tones was played prior to the illumination of the nose-poke during the nose-
poke discrimination program.  Immediately following the tone the nose-poke was 
illuminated and both levers were also simultaneously extended but not active.  Levers 
remained extended during this training period if pressed, but they did not result in any 
reward or penalty.  Tones were pseudo-randomly presented such that no more than three 
short or long tones were presented in a row.  The addition of the tones during this training 
program was made due to a concern that previously the only exposure that the subjects 
had to the tones with the opt-out option available was during testing.  This nose-poke 
discrimination program now exposed rats to each of the eight tones during nose-poke 
training.  Importantly, this training program was not designed to exclusively reinforce a 
middle tone, nose-poke contingency, as each of the tones was presented during this 
training.  
The second change that was implemented during this time was that Forced and 
Choice trials were pseudo-randomly presented during testing such that no more than three 
Forced or Choice trials were presented in a row.  Previously, all Forced and Choice trials 
were presented in blocks with Forced trials preceding Choice trials.  Finally, an aversive 
“buzzer” (70 dB, on/off pattern) was added as a penalty following an incorrect response 
during the test trials.  The penalty buzzer played for 15 s following an incorrect response.  
The buzzer was followed by a 45 s ITI before the next trial began.  The penalty buzzer 
was introduced to increase learning between correct and incorrect responses.   
After two weeks, R01 exhibited only one opt-out response and R02 demonstrated 
few opt-out responses (7.6% of trials were opted-out by R02).  Both rats still exhibited a 
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response bias for the lever associated with the short tones.  R01 demonstrated 85.7% 
accuracy for short tones and 73.2% accuracy for long tones on Choice trials; he 
demonstrated 88.7% accuracy for short tones, and 79.5% accuracy for long tones on 
Forced trials.  R02 demonstrated 88.5% accuracy for short tones, and 63.8% accuracy for 
long tones on Choice trials; he demonstrated 75.9% accuracy for short tones, and 70.7% 
accuracy for long tones on Forced trials.  Thus, two additional measures were taken to 
encourage opt-out responding and to address the response bias.  First, sucrose pellet 
rewards were reduced to one for both opt-out responses as well as correct responses.  
This change was implemented as it was determined that the maximum number of 
reinforcers for each subject was only 56 sucrose pellets per day per subject if he opted-
out.  However, the subjects’ maximum number of reinforcers was 72 sucrose pellets per 
day if each subject did not opt-out and performed at chance.  By changing the sucrose 
pellet count to a 1:1 ratio for the opt-out and correct responses, this allowed for a 
maximum of 40 sucrose pellets per day if each subject opted out and 24 sucrose pellets 
per day if each subject did not opt-out and performed at chance.   
The second change that was implemented at this time was a delay allowing for an 
8 s total trial period.  Thus, a 2 s tone was followed by a 6 s delay and an 8 s tone was 
followed by no delay.  This change was implemented due to a concern that the rats could 
have been responding to the release of the levers rather than to the tone durations.  
Behavior changes following a consistent trial duration regardless of tone duration would 
help to determine whether the subjects were responding based on the length of the tones 
or the length of the delay period following each tone.  Equalizing the total trial period 
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was an effort to eradicate the inherent differences among trial period based on tone 
length.   
This change created substantial behavior changes in both rats following one week 
of testing.  Both subjects exhibited a strong bias for the lever associated with the long 
tone durations and each subject’s accuracy for the short tone durations decreased 
considerably.  R01 demonstrated 36.5% accuracy for short tones, and 83.8% accuracy for 
long tones on Choice trials; he demonstrated 39.5% accuracy for short tones, and 69.8% 
accuracy for long tones on Forced trials. R02 demonstrated 40.5% accuracy for short 
tones, and 68.3% accuracy for long tones on Choice trials; he demonstrated 27% 
accuracy for short tones, and 76.8% accuracy for long tones on Forced trials.    R02’s opt-
out rate also increased (32.14% of trials were opted-out by R02) and he frequently 
attempted to opt-out on Forced as well as Choice trials.  R02 exhibited long latencies 
prior to responding.  
One week later, two additional changes were implemented. The ITI was changed 
from 45 s to 10 s.  This was done in an effort to decrease delays and increase motivation. 
The penalty buzzer was also changed from 15 s to 20 s at this time so that the penalty 
buzzer would be long in comparison to the ITI.  The pilot testing continued for 2.5 
weeks.  Accuracy remained low following these changes, particularly for short tones.  
R01 demonstrated 39.5% accuracy for short tones and 75.8% accuracy for long tones on 
Choice trials; he demonstrated 38.7% accuracy for short tones and 70.6% accuracy for 
long tones on Forced trials. R02 demonstrated 14.7% accuracy for short tones and 67.9% 
accuracy for long tones on Choice trials; he demonstrated 26.6% accuracy for short tones 
and 71.0% accuracy for long tones on Forced trials. 
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Because of the low number of correct trials for both subjects, it was reasoned that 
the subjects had not learned the initial tone discriminations.  The pilot testing was ceased 
at this point and an effort was made to retrain the subjects on the tone discriminations to 
increase accuracy to at least 90%.  A series of retraining programs were implemented 
immediately following the initial testing.  First, a tone discrimination program was begun 
during which 2 and 8 s tones were played in a pseudorandom order in which no more 
than three of the same tone durations were played in a row.  A correct lever press 
response in which the tone duration matched the corresponding “short” or “long” lever 
was followed by a single sucrose pellet reward and then a 10 s ITI.  An incorrect lever 
press response was followed by a 20 s penalty buzzer and then a 10 s ITI.  This program 
ran for 60 min for nearly four weeks.  R01 responded at 62.3% accuracy for short tones 
and 83.5% accuracy for long tones, while R02 responded at 81.3% accuracy for short 
tones and 66.9% accuracy for long tones during the final week of this training phase.   
Due to the low accuracies recorded during the unblocked trials, a blocked tone 
discrimination program was implemented with 2 and 8 s tones played in blocks of ten.  
For example, a 2 s tone would be presented followed by the presentation of both levers.  
Following a response, the same tone was presented for nine additional trials.  Then the 8 s 
tone was presented for ten trials.  This continued for six rounds (three 2 s rounds and 
three 8 s rounds) each day.  The blocked tone discrimination program ran for four weeks.  
R01 was reliably responding at 93.8% accuracy for short tones and 89.2% accuracy for 
long tones, while R02 responded at 93.1% accuracy for short tones and 82.2% accuracy 
for long tones during the last week of the training period.   
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Finally, the unblocked tone discrimination program with 2 and 8 s tones was 
reintroduced for 60 min per day for two weeks.  The penalty buzzer was also removed 
during this time, as there was no evidence that it influenced learning between correct and 
incorrect responses in either subject. R01 responded at 85.2% accuracy for short tones 
and 82.3% accuracy for long tones, while R02 responded at 81.3% accuracy for short 
tones and 73.7% accuracy for the long tones during the final week of this training period.  
Because performance improved and was consistent for seven days during this training 
phase, the decision was made to implement the full testing program.  
Testing 
At this point, the full testing program was introduced during which all tone 
durations were played and the opt-out option was made available during Choice trials.  
This program was similar to that previously described in the pilot study with a few 
important adjustments.  A delay allowing for an 8 s total trial period was implemented for 
each tone duration.  All response options, including levers for the Forced trials and levers 
and the nose-poke for Choice trials, were activated following this 8 s trial period. Correct 
responses were followed by one sucrose pellet.  Incorrect responses were followed by a 
20 s timeout instead of a 15 s penalty buzzer.  This testing program did not include a 
penalty buzzer following incorrect responses.  Opt-out responses were followed by one 
sucrose pellet.  A 10 s ITI was implemented between trials.  Sixteen Choice and eight 
Forced trials were pseudo-randomly presented such that no more than three of each tone 
(short or long) and no more than three of each trial type (Choice or Forced) were played 
in a row.  This pattern of pseudo randomly presented tones in two rounds each day.  Data 
collected for each trial included trial type, tone duration, tone type, tone difficulty, 
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response, response latency, and outcome.  This testing phase continued for seven weeks 
until stability in the number of opt-out responses was reached for each subject.      
Results 
First, it was expected that the rate of opt-out responses would increase as the 
difficulty of the stimulus discrimination increased during Choice trials.  Difficulty levels 
were collapsed across tone durations for all analyses with Level 1 indicating the least 
difficult tone durations (2.00 and 8.00 s) and Level 4 representing the most difficult tone 
durations (3.82 and 4.19 s).  An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.  No 
analysis was performed for opt-out responses for R01, as he never selected the opt-out 
option during testing.  A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the 
relation between opt-out responses and difficulty level for R02. The relation between 
these variables was not significant, X
2 
(3, N = 1) = 6.81, p > .07.  Opt-out responses did 
increase as difficulty level increased for R02, but not significantly (see Figure 1).   
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Figure 1. 
Opt-out Responses by Level of Difficulty for R02  
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Secondly, accuracy was expected to decline as difficulty of the stimulus 
discrimination increased. A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine 
the relation between accuracy and difficulty level for each rat within choice and forced 
trials.  Choice trial accuracy significantly decreased as the level of difficulty increased for 
both subjects (R01 Forced trials, X
2 
(3, N = 1) = 117.55, p < .00; R01 Choice Trials, X
2 
(3, 
N = 1) = 37.68, p < .00 (see Figure 2); R02 Choice trials, X
2 
(3, N = 1) = 28.65, p < .00; 
R02 Forced trials, X
2 
(3, N = 1) = 8.77, p < .00 (see Figure 3).   
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Figure 2. 
Percentage of Correct Responses by Level of Difficulty, R01 Forced Trials 
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Figure 3. 
Percentage of Correct Responses by Level of Difficulty, R02 Forced Trials  
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Finally, accuracy was expected to be higher on Choice trials compared to Forced 
trials.  Subjects should have opted-out on the trials in which they were more likely to err, 
increasing the accuracy during Choice trials because it did not include the opted-out 
trials.  A one-tailed z-test for two proportions was performed to determine whether the 
accuracy of the Choice and Forced groups were significantly different at each of the four 
levels of difficulty.  A significant difference was found for the accuracy of Choice and 
Forced trials for R01 only for difficulty Level 1, z = 1.91, p < .05.  No significant 
difference was found for the accuracy of Choice and Forced trials for Level 2, z = 0.10, p 
> .05; for Level 3, z = 0.62, p > .05; or for Level 4, z = 0.14, p > .05 (see Figure 4).  One 
would not expect a difference in accuracy between Choice and Forced trials since R01 
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did not opt-out.  Accuracy was determined by removing opt-out responses from the total 
number of Choice trials for R02.  A significant difference was found for the accuracy of 
Choice and Forced trials for R02 for each level of difficulty, with Level 1, z = 5.12, p < 
.05; Level 2; z = 3.26, p < .05; Level 3, p < .05, z = 2.67; and Level 4, z = 1.70, p < .05 
(see Figure 5). R01’s accuracy was only statistically significant between Choice and 
Forced trials during the least difficult levels.  R02, however, displayed significantly better 
performance on Choice compared to Forced trials on all levels of difficulty.    
Figure 4. 
Percentage Correct for Choice and Forced Trials for R01 
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Figure 5. 
Percentage Correct for Choice and Forced Trials for R02 
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Discussion 
This experiment provides at least some evidence that one rat knows when it does 
not know the correct response on a duration-discrimination task.  If the rats knew when 
they did not know, they should have opted out on the trials in which they were more 
likely to err.  Also, the accuracy of Choice trials should be higher than the accuracy of the 
Forced trials if the rats knew when they did not know.  Although the frequency of R02’s 
opt-out responses did not increase significantly from one level of difficulty to the next, 
overall, he did show a trend toward increased opt-out responses as difficulty increased.  
Also, R02’s accuracy for Choice trials was higher than his accuracy for Forced trials at 
each level of difficulty. Forced trial accuracies included trials with tone durations that 
were difficult and likely would have been declined if the opt-out option had been 
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available as it was during Choice trials.  This provides evidence for uncertainty 
monitoring in one rat.  
R01 did not show evidence of uncertainty monitoring, as he did not opt-out during 
testing.  This could suggest that he did not know when he did not know.  Alternatively, 
this behavior might suggest that the trials were not sufficiently difficult enough to 
encourage R01 to opt-out.  This argument would logically follow if R01 had been 
capable of responding accurately on most trials, regardless of increasing difficulty levels.  
In fact, R01’s accuracy was higher than R02’s accuracy for all but the most difficult trial 
level during Forced trials.  Yet, R01’s accuracy decreased as trial difficulty increased for 
both Forced and Choice trials.  His accuracy at the most difficult level was at chance 
performance for both Forced and Choice trials.  Therefore, regardless of his improved 
performance relative to R02, it would have been adaptive for him to use the opt-out 
response as trial difficulty increased.   
One explanation for R01’s lack of opt-out responses during testing could be that 
he did not learn the nose-poke behavior during training.  However, he quickly learned the 
contingency for the initial nose-poke training, as well as the nose-poke discrimination 
program used prior to testing during the pilot study.  R01 simply did not apply the nose-
poke response learned during training to the testing trials.  One possibility as to why R01 
did not opt-out during testing is that he responded only to the levers when they were 
made available.  The likelihood of this explanation is increased by the fact that the levers 
produce noise when extended while the nose-poke is inaudible when activated.  Several 
measures were taken during pilot testing to reduce this inconsistency.  First, a 
discriminatory light (110 mcd, orange LED) was added above the nose-poke in each 
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chamber in addition to the same light that was originally added to the inside of the nose-
poke.  Both lights were illuminated upon activation of the nose-poke.  Secondly, the 
nose-poke discrimination program introduced immediately before the pilot tests was 
modified to include extended and inactive levers.  Once a tone was played, both levers 
were extended and the nose-poke was simultaneously activated.  No reward or penalty 
was delivered until the photobeam inside the nose-poke was broken.  These efforts had 
no impact on R01’s tendency to lever-press when presented with the opportunity.  While 
it is unclear what motivated this behavior, future research efforts would likely benefit 
from reducing the difference in saliency between the onset of the opt-out and opt-in 
options.  For example, two identical auditory cues or visual cues should signal the onset 
of both options.                       
This experiment was designed to further explore comparative research in 
uncertainty monitoring in rats.  It was hoped that the results would clarify and extend the 
findings of previous metacognition experiments in rats by Smith and Schull (1989) and 
Foote and Crystal (2007).  One method that was planned to meet this goal was to increase 
the number of subjects to avoid limited results from a small sample size.  However, due 
to the difficulty in reliably establishing nose-poke responses and tone discrimination 
during testing, only two subjects were included in this experiment. There is no evidence 
to suggest that these two subjects were exhibiting unique behavior.  In fact, Foote and 
Crystal (2007) faced similar challenges in that five of their eight rats “rarely declined to 
take the duration test” likely because they “failed to learn the experimental contingency 
of the nose-poke aperture.”  
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Another strategy implemented to clarify and extend previous findings was the use 
of a simultaneous judgment-and-test design.  The simultaneous task is a more 
straightforward approach requiring only one step in which both the judgment and test are 
presented together, whereas the prospective task requires an initial judgment about future 
behavior prior to giving an answer.  The simultaneous task is thought to be a less difficult 
task, although as previously indicated, the subjects in this experiment had numerous 
problems learning the duration-discrimination task and effectively utilizing the opt-out 
response.  Several efforts were taken to improve accuracy on the duration-discrimination 
task following the pilot study.  A series of tone discrimination programs were initiated, 
including unblocked 2.00 and 8.00 s tone durations, blocks of tones of the same duration, 
and again, unblocked tones of the same duration.  This additional training occurred daily 
over a nine-week period, improving performance to an average of 85-90% accuracy.      
Another method in this experiment was to use more difficult stimuli to avoid the 
ceiling effects found by the Foote and Crystal experiment. Intermediate tones were 
introduced during testing to increase the level of difficulty during the task.  It was 
hypothesized that accuracy would increase as the level of difficulty of the task increased. 
R01 and R02 both demonstrated decreased performance as the level of difficulty 
increased for both Forced and Choice trials.  Importantly, while both subjects’ accuracy 
decreased on more difficult trials, the performance trends varied between the two 
subjects.  R01’s performance graph shows a linear decline by difficulty level, while 
R02’s performance graph only declines between difficulty Levels 2 and 3.  The 
performance of both of the subjects in this study differs from Foote and Crystal’s (2007) 
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results, such that performance declined throughout and during increasing levels of 
difficulty rather than only declining during the most difficult level.    
An additional limitation with this experiment could have been that the 
intermediate tones were not introduced during pretraining. This method was used to 
enhance tone discrimination between the short and long anchor tones.  However, the first 
time the rats were exposed to the intermediate tones was during the initial testing phase 
and this was also the first time that they had been exposed to a tone followed by the 
availability of the opt-out option.  This could have influenced the way that the 
intermediate tones were categorized and the behavioral responses to them. This training 
may have created a contingency in which the opt-out option became the middle response 
rather than an uncertainty response (e.g., Beran, Smith, Coutinho, Couchman, & Boomer, 
2009).  Further studies may benefit from a pretraining period during which the rats are 
exposed to intermediate tones.  It is important to note, however, that opt-out responses 
particular to intermediate categories should be avoided during pretraining so that the 
animal is not simply reenacting previously reinforced behavior (Terrace & Son, 2009).   
A final, and most significant, improvement upon the Smith and Schull (1989) 
experiment was to compare accuracy on trials in which the rats could opt out and those in 
which they could not.  Unlike the Smith and Schull (1989) experiment, comparisons in 
accuracy between Choice and Forced trials during the current study allowed for a better 
understanding of how the opt-out option was being used.  If rats were using the opt-out 
option adaptively and were opting out on trials in which they did not know the answer, 
accuracy was expected to be higher for the Choice compared to the Forced trials.  If the 
rats were not using the opt-out option in an adaptive way, no significant differences 
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would have been expected between the Choice and Forced trials because opted-in and 
opted-out trials would be selected at random.  A significant difference was found between 
Choice and Forced trials at each level of difficulty for R02.  R01 did not opt-out during 
testing although he did display a difference between Choice and Forced trials only at the 
least difficult trial level.  This finding is not consistent with R01’s other responses during 
testing and is unlikely to hold theoretical significance.   
One challenge that existed in this study was the use of a duration discrimination 
task.  Duration tasks present particular difficulties during comparative research.  One 
problem is that duration tasks such as the one used in this experiment are temporal, 
memory-based tasks, requiring subjects to recall the onset and offset of the tone and to 
make a comparison between the two times.  Previous studies have suggested that rats 
experience episodic-memory similarly to humans (Babb & Crystal, 2005a, 2005b; Babb 
& Crystal, 2006; Crystal, 2006).  More recent evidence suggests that while rats can 
successfully track short and long time intervals, they may differ significantly from 
humans in how they solve such tasks.  For example, there is evidence to suggest that rats 
rely on cues regarding how long ago an event occurred rather than mentally time 
traveling to determine when an event occurred as humans and perhaps some other 
animals, such as scrub jays, do (e.g., Clayton, Yu, & Dickinson, 2001; Roberts, Feeney, 
MacPherson, Petter, McMillan, & Musolino, 2008).  This suggests that rats may rely on 
other cues, such as elapsed time, to solve these tasks (Friedman, 1993).  Frequency 
discrimination, which is a basic component of the auditory system of mammals, may 
provide a simpler perceptual problem-solving task that could be used during uncertainty 
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monitoring tasks in nonhuman species without the complication introduced by temporal 
processing tasks (e.g., Talwar & Gerstein, 1998).  
An additional challenge during this study was determining the amount of reward 
to be delivered for opt-in and opt-out responses.  The sugar pellet reward was reduced to 
one pellet for both a correct response and an opt-out response following initial testing. By 
changing the sucrose pellet count to a 1:1 ratio for the opt-out and correct responses, this 
allowed for a maximum of 40 sucrose pellets per day if each rat opted out and 24 sucrose 
pellets per day if each rat did not opt-out and performed at chance. Reducing the correct 
response reward quantity was a measure taken to encourage opt-out responses as there 
was previously no net reward to be gained by opting-out.  However, one could argue that 
this methodological change reduces the likelihood of a cognitive explanation for why the 
rats might use the opt-out response at all.  Previous studies involving comparative 
metacognition have been criticized when subjects are reinforced for opt-out responses or 
when opt-out responding increases the frequency of reward (Beran, Smith, Coutinho, 
Couchman, & Boomer, 2009; Terrace & Son, 2009).  This methodological approach may 
create a middle response rather than an uncertain response and lends itself to an 
associative explanation rather than a cognitive one.  Effort should be made in future 
comparative metacognition research to merge learning research in behavioral economics 
with uncertainty monitoring tasks.  Some success has already occurred on this front in 
studies that have utilized post-decision wagering to uncover information regarding 
certainty and uncertainty about a question posed during a cognitive or perceptual task 
(Kepecs, Uchida, Zariwala, Mainen, 2009; Koch & Preuschoff, 2007; Persuad, McLeod, 
& Cowey, 2007).  
 
 41 
The goal of this study was to provide clarification to previous findings and to 
discover further evidence about uncertainty monitoring in rats.  This experiment provides 
additional evidence that at least one rat may know when it does not know the correct 
response to a duration-discrimination task.  Such evidence lends greater understanding to 
the evolutionary development of metacognition and reveals compelling insights into the 
phylogeny of at least one aspect of metacognitive processing.  Future research should 
consider the challenges in comparative uncertainty monitoring tasks previously 
discussed, including the behavioral implications of the amount of reward disseminated, 
the confounds associated with the use of a temporal-based task, and the complexity of a 
psychological middle.  
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